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ABSTRACT
Co-patents are outcomes of R&D collaboration, which has been
proven with higher-quality. Does this mean that high-quality pat-
ents should also extend their advantage to the technology mar-
ket? Based on the transaction cost theory, we use the China
National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) database
and logit model to explore the effect of co-ownership on firms’
patent commercialization and the factors of co-patents that affect
their commercialization. Our findings illustrate that co-ownership
has a negative impact on patent commercialization. In addition,
the co-owner’s nature, country, and co-patent’s industry influence
the commercialization of co-patents. Firstly, a company and a uni-
versity or research institution’s co-owned co-patents are less likely
to be commercialization than a company and a company co-
owned co-patents. Secondly, multi-countries co-owned co-patents
are less likely to be commercialization than a single-country co-
owned co-patents. Thirdly, co-patents in high technology (high-
tech) industries are less likely to be commercialization than co-
patents in non-high-tech industries. This paper supports policy-
makers in implementing policies to promote the co-patents’ com-
mercialization. Meanwhile, our paper suggests that to pursue the
economic value of the R&D collaborative intellectual property
fruits, R&D collaborative intellectual property fruits are not be
encouraged to be applied as the co-patents.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 2 April 2020








It is a significant phenomenon that increasingly more co-patents which jointly owned
by two or more appliers were developed during the past 40 years (Belderbos et al.,
2010; Hagedoorn, 2003). For example, in the United States, the proportion of the
number of co-patents, in the total number of patent applications increased from
0.20% in the early 1980s to approximately 8.00% by the end of the 1990s (Kroll &
Mallig, 2009). In China, the proportion of the number of co-patents in the total num-
ber of patent applications rose from 5.60% in 1985 to 7.40% in 2019.1 In Europe, the
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proportion of the number of co-patents in the total number of patent applications
was 3.80% in 1978, while it was 6.30% in 2009 (Wade, 2014).
Given this significant phenomenon, scholars have provided insightful knowledge
about it. The existing literature’s topics related to the co-patents mainly focus on the
incentive for arranging the intellectual property in the R&D collaboration process as
co-patents (Agostini & Caviggioli, 2015), co-patents’ high quality (Belderbos et al.,
2014; Briggs, 2015; Hagedoorn et al., 2003; Paradiso & Pietrowski, 2009; Wade, 2014),
and co-patents’ negative effect on company’s market value (Liu et al., 2019). As for
the incentive for co-patents arising, firstly, during the R&D collaboration process, the
collaborative technology and relationship are complex that may make it difficult to
divide the innovation fruit clearly (Agostini & Caviggioli, 2015). Secondly, co-patent
would like to be used as an important signal to manifest the desirable strategic alli-
ance incentive between partners (Belderbos et al., 2014). As for the co-patents’ qual-
ity, the researching results indicated that co-patents have a positive impact on patent
quality (Belderbos et al., 2014). Moreover, the multicountry co-ownership of a patent
positively impacts patent quality than patents co-owned within a single country
(Belderbos et al., 2014; Briggs, 2015; Hagedoorn et al., 2003; Paradiso & Pietrowski,
2009; Wade, 2014). As for the effect of co-patents on a company’s market value,
Belderbos et al. (2014) and Lv et al. (2018) indicated the co-patent intensity is nega-
tively correlated with a company’s market value, although a co-patent with a univer-
sity is associated with a higher market value.
However, patents also have become popular ‘goods’ in the technology market, and
how these co-patents behave in the technology market is still understudied. It is well
known that innovations are crucial for economic growth, and the important value of
an innovation is increasing in the economic value that it creates (Svensson, 2007;
Tian et al., 2020). Wade (2014) indicated that co-patents are high-quality innovation.
From the perspective of increasing the circulation of high-quality intellectual prop-
erty resources in the technology market and enlarge the public welfare and increase
the economic value of patents (Pinto et al., 2019), co-patents are likely to be encour-
aged to flow actively (Briggs & Wade, 2014; Funk, 2013; Tvaronavicien_e &
Cerneviciut _e, 2015). However, tension may exist between hope and reality. On the
one hand, co-owners have the same right to own and exploit the invention on their
behalf according to the patent law (Belderbos et al., 2014). This complex co-owner-
ship induces a negative relationship between the number of co-patents and the own-
er’s market value (Belderbos et al., 2010; 2014; Lv et al., 2018). On the other hand,
the law of most countries such as European countries, except for France, and the
law of Japan, China, Korea, and Taiwan has a regulation that each patent’s owner
needs prior consent with other co-owners in the co-patent’s utilization, sole license,
exclusive license or assignment to a third party (Hashimoto et al., 2012), which may
induce a constrained effect on the co-patent’s commercialization for inducing the
intellectual property infringement risk, according to the transaction cost theory. In
this situation, the effect of co-ownership on a firm’s patents’ commercialization and
the factors of co-patents that affect their commercialization are worth a discussion.
However, we rarely found any papers that refer to our topic in the exist-
ing literature.
2 L. LI ET AL.
In this study, we address this gap by taking Chinese co-patents as the case. We
empirically explore the effect of co-ownership on a firm’s patents’ commercialization
and the factors of co-patents that affect their commercialization by using the China
National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) database. This study finds
that co-ownership has a negative impact on the commercialization of patents. In add-
ition, the co-owner’s nature, country, and co-patent’s industry influence the commer-
cialization of a co-patent. On the one hand, a company and a university or research
institution’s co-owned co-patents are less likely to be commercialized on the technol-
ogy market than a company and a company co-owned co-patents. On the other
hand, multi-countries co-owned co-patents are less likely to be commercialized on
the technology market than single-country co-owned co-patents. Moreover, co-pat-
ents belonging to high-tech industries are less likely to be commercialized on the
technology market than co-patents belonging to non-high-tech industries.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature and provides implications
for policymakers and practitioners. First, our research enlarges and enriches the com-
mercialization theory of patents. We find that there exist different commercial
degrees between co-patents and single-owner patents, which have never been referred
to in the existing literature. Co-ownership has a negative impact on the commercial-
ization of patents. The co-patents become inconsequential for commercialization and
good quality as an advantage cannot play their role. Second, our research indirectly
supports that applying the intellectual property of R&D collaboration fruits as co-pat-
ents is not a firm’s best option. The existing literature got this point on the aspect of
co-patents’ negative effect on the company’s market value and performance. Our
research strengthens this point from the perspective of patents’ commercialization,
which gives the scholars and practitioners a new viewing angle to concern this prob-
lem. For practitioners, our paper provides advice for firms to properly arrange R&D
achievement based on their commercial goals. At the same time, from the point of
enlarging the public welfare and increasing the economic value of patents, our paper
inspires policymakers to adjust patent administrative regulations to promote the flow-
ing of co-patents in the technology market.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Following this introduction, we
review the relevant literature and introduce four hypotheses in Section 2. Then, the
methodology is shown in Section 3. In Section 4, the empirical results are presented
and discussed. In Section 5, we make a robust analysis. Finally, we conclude the main
findings and discuss some theoretical and managerial implications, limitations in the
last section.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
Our hypotheses deduction is based on transaction cost theory. The transaction cost
theory was first put forward by Coase et al. (Coase, 1937). It was mentioned that
firms and the market traders need to pay extra costs due to asymmetric information
in the real market. Besides, contracts in an uncertain environment are sometimes
incomplete and must be frequently renegotiated.
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According to the literature,‘patent’s commercialization’ means that the owner of the
patent obtains income from a patent, which includes converting a patented technology
generating new product and getting income in the internal firm, patent licensing, and
patent sale (Svensson, 2007). Our paper focuses on patent’s licensing and sale, for it is
difficult to observe and trace a firm using their patents to create income in the internal
firm. Licensing means the patent’ owner gives the right to licensees for using the tech-
nology with some prepaid fee (Palomeras, 2007), but the patent’s ownership does not
be changed. Differently, the sale means the patent owner loses all rights and the poten-
tial liabilities on the patent with a one-off payment (Serrano, 2010). The enforcement
rules of co-patents in the world can be classified into two categories. In the United
States and France, the patent laws relevant to co-patents and single -owner patents are
nearly the same, and the commercialization of co-patents does not need prior consent
with other co-owners in co-patents’ utilization, license, or assignment to a third party
unless there is another existing agreement (Paradiso & Pietrowski, 2009). In European
countries, except for France, and in Japan, China, Korea, and Taiwan, the patent laws
relevant to co-patents and single-owner patents are different. Each patent’s owner needs
to reach prior consent with other co-owners for the co-patent’s utilization, license, or
assignment to a third party (Hashimoto et al., 2012). For example, Chinese patent law
emphasizes that ‘unless other agreements exist, the co-owner can exploit the patent
benefit alone in common licensing, and the benefit should be shared by all co-owners
while other commercial modes need to obey the unanimous rule’.2 The license can be
classified as the common license, the sole license, and the exclusive license. In China,
sole licenses and exclusive licenses are the main license methods. As a result, the unani-
mous rule can limit the number of patent co-owners and prevent one partner from
seeking benefits for itself at the expense of sacrificing other co-owners’ benefit by the
sole license, exclusive license, and the patent trade. Based on these, Sun and Cao (2011)
declare that it has a negative effect on co-patents’ commercialization from the perspec-
tive of transaction costs. The transaction costs include the search cost, negotiation cost,
contract cost, service cost, risk cost, etc. (Cheng & Lee, 2011; Chiles & McMackin,
1996; Dyer, 1997). First, the technical complexity of co-patents will increase the con-
tract and service costs (Winkelbach & Walter, 2015). Second, if one co-owner wants to
license or sell a co-patent, he must obtain an agreement with another co-owner of this
co-patent according to the patent law or he will face the intellectual property infringe-
ment risk. In this process, a negotiation cost will be incurred, and the unanimous rule
would greatly increase the negotiation cost of commercialization because different co-
owners have different opinions on the economic value of co-patents and different atti-
tudes on patent licensing and sale. Third, the co-ownership of co-patents can induce
an uncertainty risk due to asymmetric information for buyers or licensees and reduce
their desire to buy or obtain licensing (Belderbos et al., 2014; Lv et al., 2018).
Compared to a single-owner patent, the contract, service, and negotiation costs of co-
patents are higher, which means that the transaction cost of a co-patent is higher than
the transaction cost of a single-owner patent. Thus, we formulate the follow-
ing hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Co-patents will be less likely to be commercialized than single-
owner patents.
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The types of co-owners are diversified (Belderbos et al., 2014), and different organ-
izations have different objectives for R&D collaboration and different attitudes on the
commercialization of co-patents. The companies, universities, and research institu-
tions are the core force on the road of technology innovation.
As for the co-owners that are companies and university/research institutions, a
contradiction always exists on the first option about the academic and commercial
demands. Commercial profit is the main goal for companies, which usually avoid
high risky research with strong commercial purposes, and it tends to make the R&D
achievements commercialize as soon as possible. Although university technology
transfer to the sustainable development of universities and society is important
(Paniccia & Baiocco, 2018), universities/research institutions tend to do research proj-
ects in a long period and less predictability (Gregorio & Shane, 2003), which means
that the commercialization pace of co-patents is slowed down for further continuous
deep study. Moreover, universities/research institutions are enthusiastic about pub-
lishing their breakthrough ideas as quickly as possible, while firms’ commercialization
incentives need the breakthrough hidden and delay published (Blumenthal et al.,
1997; Stern, 2004). As a result, as for the universities/research institutions, either
there will be a high negotiation cost for co-patent commercialization or universities/
research institutions will not agree to make the co-patent commercialization at all.
Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The company and universities/research institutions’ co-patents are less
likely to be commercialized than co-patents among companies.
From the perspective of co-owners’ geographical distribution, co-patents can be
classified as multi-countries co-owned and single country co-owned (Briggs, 2015).
First, co-patents have not only more claims and backward citations within and out-
side of the firm but also more novel technology combinations (Lv et al., 2018), which
is more likely to induce an intellectual property infringement problem (Holbrook,
2016; Lemley, 2005), because different countries patent laws are different and have a
legal territory limit (Torremans, 2016). Once the co-patent is commercialized, the
partners will worry about the patent infringement problem induced from the unfamil-
iar foreign environment. Second, if the co-patents of multi-countries co-owned do
not apply for the protection from the foreign country according to the Paris
Convention approach or the Patent Cooperation Treaty,3 their commercialization will
be limited. Third, because of distance, the co-patents of multi-countries co-owned
will have a higher communication cost (Gao et al., 2015). These reasons will greatly
increase the negotiation cost and do not benefit co-patents’ commercialization. Thus,
we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Multi-countries’ co-owned co-patents are less likely to be commercialized
than a single country’s co-owned co-patents.
From the perspective of industries, co-patents can be divided into belonging to
high-tech industries and belonging to non-high-tech industries. High-tech industries
always represent the advanced technologies developed and are an important factor for
the driving force of economic development and upgrading the industrial structure in
a science and technology-based economy. The government tends to give some
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political and financial support for these high-tech industries. For example, in China,
the Torch Program for high-tech industries has been carried out since the 1980s, of
which, the subsidy was given to promote the R&D actives, and about 60.17 billion
Yuan are spent during the past three decades (Hong et al., 2016). The co-patents
application is a strong signal for R&D collaboration actives. The co-patents which
belong to the high-tech industries will bring more attraction for government subsidy
and political support. Due to this, the co-patent’s owner tends to hold it rather than
license or trade it. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Co-patents belonging to high-tech industries are less likely to be
commercialized than co-patents belonging to non-high-tech industries.
3. Materials and methods
3.1. Data sources
Empirical data come from the China National Intellectual Property Administration
(CNIPA). The Patent Law of China was implemented in 1985, and the CNIPA began
to formally record the patent’s information this year.4 We downloaded data on the
internet http://epub.sipo.gov.cn/gjcx.jsp. After choosing the application year interval
from 1985 to 2019, the patent’s detailed information is shown on the net. Then we
manual sort the information of patents we need, such as applied number, applier’
name, granting year, the number of applicants, classification, PCT, law information,
etc. If the number of applicants is two or more, a patent is regarded as a co-patent,
and otherwise, it is a single-owner patent. We made the basic statistics of co-patents
according to the CNIPA. The total number of granted invention co-patents is
212,113 from 1985 to 2019. The percentage of co-patents on the total granted inven-
tion patents fluctuates between 5% and 10% from 1985 to 2019, which is shown in
Figure 1.
The number of co-patent applicants is between 2 and 27. The percentage of co-
patents whose number of applicants is 2 is 82.32%, which is the largest proportion in
the total granted co-patents. The co-patents that have three applicants have a percent-
age of approximately 13.32%, and other co-patents have a percentage of
Figure 1. Percentage of co-patents in total granted invention patents, 1985–2019.
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approximately 4.36%, which is shown in Table 1. In our paper, we choose the co-pat-
ents whose applicants’ number is 2 to finish our empirical analysis because this
choice represents the main group and is feasible for the control variables.
The co-owners’ country can be divided into domestic and foreign cooperation and
domestic and domestic cooperation, which is also shown in Table1. Domestic-domes-
tic cooperation co-patents have the largest proportion, which is 83.15%, while the
proportion of domestic -foreign cooperation co-patents is 3.21%.
The co-owners’ nature can be classified into the cooperation between companies,
between a company and a university or research institution, between a company and
an individual, between individuals, and between an individual and a university or
research institution, etc. The distribution of co-owners’ nature is shown in Table 2.
In this group, the company-company cooperative co-patents have the largest propor-
tion, which is 50.19%. The company-university/research institution cooperative co-
patents have the second-ranked proportion, which is 25.83%. In this paper, our focus
is discussing the joint company co-patents. This choice represents the main group
and is feasible for the control variables.
For co-patents, the patent licensing data begins in 2002, and patent trading data
begins in 2007. Our paper chooses 2002–2019 as the observation year window. To
verify Hypotheses 1, we choose the co-patents whose applicants’ number is 2 and the
applicants including companies as our treated group samples. After dropping invalid
data such as unpaid, expired, and invalid patents before 2002, we obtain 145,089 co-
patents as our treated group samples. To detect the influence of co-ownership on the
patents’ commercialization, we compare co-patent commercialization with single-
owner patents. We use patent variables such as the number of claims, the patent
scope, PCT. application, and some firm variables, such as firm size as our chosen
Table 1. The distribution of the number of co-patent applicants and co-owner’s country.
Number of applicants Number Percentage Co-owner’s country Number Percentage
2 174,608 82.32% Domestic-Domestic 176,380 83.15%
3 28,264 13.32% Domestic-Foreign 6,804 3.21%
4 6,232 2.94% Foreign-Foreign 28,929 13.64%





Table 2. The distribution of the cooperative co-owner’s nature.
Co-owner’s nature Number Percentage
Company-company 106,462 50.19%
Company-university/research institution 54,798 25.83%
Individual-individual 22,261 10.49%
University/research institution-university/research institution 11,327 5.34%
Company-individual 8,343 3.93%
Company-others 2,850 1.34%
Individual-university/research institution 2,748 1.30%
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criteria, and a nearest-neighbor 1:1 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is used to iden-
tify our untreated group sample. Then we combined the treated and untreated group
and convert these groups as the patent-year observations sample from 2002 to 2019.
We let a patent stay in our sample if this patent does not expire, be invalid, licensed,
or traded before and in the observation year, otherwise, this year is regarded as its
deadline year and it will be removed in the subsequent observation years. At last,
4,865,588 patent-year observations from 2002 to 2019 is our final sample.
To verify Hypotheses 2–4, we select the co-patents whose co-owners’ nature is
between companies and between a company and a university/research institution.
Besides, we select the co-patents whose co-owners’ country types are domestic and
foreign, and domestic and domestic. We get 2,000,884 patent-year observations from
2002 to 2019 are our final sample patents.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Dependent variable
We use the status as the dependent variable to describe the condition of a patent and
it is set as the dummy variable. We set status as 0 when a patent is held by the firm
in the observation year; we set status as 1when a patent is sold or licensed by the
firm in the observation year.
3.2.2. Independent variables
We set the dummy variable co-patent, co-owner’s nature, co-owner’s country, high-tech
industries as independent variables. If the number of patent applicants is equal to
two, this patent is regarded as a co-patent and is coded as 1; otherwise, it is coded as
0. If the co-patents are co-owned between companies, the co-owners’ nature is coded
as 0. If the co-patents are co-owned by a company and a university or research insti-
tution, the co-owners’ nature is coded as 1. The co-owners’ country is coded as 0 if
the co-patent is co-owned by a single country or is coded as 1 if the co-patent is co-
owned by multi-countries. If the co-patents belong to high-tech industries, the high-
tech industries is coded as 1; otherwise, it is coded as 0. Here, the high-tech industries
are identified according to the classification criteria published by the China Science
and Technology Statistics website.5
3.2.3. Control variables
Co-patents are co-owned between companies and between a company and a univer-
sity/research institution. If the co-patents’ co-owners are companies, we control the
first applicant’s variables. If the co-patents’ co-owners are a company and a univer-
sity/research institution, we control the company’s variables.
Patent scope (Scope): Patent scope reflects the broadness of the technological range
which the patent covers (Palomeras, 2007). The patent scope is calculated by taking
the number of patent technological classifications based on the international patents
classification (IPC) (Lerner, 1994).
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Number of patent claims (Claims): Claims are essential to a patent as they pre-
scribe the limits of what is attempted to be protected and it can reflect the patent’s
value, which will influence the patent’s commercialization (Tong & Frame, 1994).
Core vs. non-core technologies (Core). Firms are more likely to license or sell their
non-core technologies (Jeong et al., 2013). We use the patent share (PS) and the
firm’s revealed technology advantage (RTA) to identify the patent belong to the core
or non-core technologies (Ljungberg et al., 2013). PS and RTA are calculated as













where Pij is the number of valid patents in the technological field i owned by firm j.
The core vs. non-core technologies is the dummy variable. If the patent share is
more than 3% and the RTA is more than 2%, the technology is the core technology
and set as 1. Otherwise, technology is non-core technology and set as 0 (Gambardella
et al., 2007).
Patent Cooperation Treaty Application (PCT): The Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT.) is the international treaty that defines the patent rights granted between the
contracting states. A PCT. patent will be popular in the international technology mar-
ket (Sternitzke, 2009). If a patent has PCT, it is coded as 1, otherwise, it is coded
as 0.
Competition (Competition): Competitive structure like a firm’s monopolistic pos-
ition or perfect competition in the technology market may affect the patent commer-
cialization. Competition is measured as the share of the patents held by the top four
applicants in each four-digit IPC patent class (Gambardella et al., 2007).
Firm size (portfolio): Gambardella et al. (2007) regarded that the firm size will
impact the commercialization of patents. The firm size is positive correction with the
patent portfolio size (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003), and we calculate this variable by taking
the number of valid patents owned by the firm in the observation year
(Chang, 2011).
Year dummy is set to control the time-fixed effects. Technology class dummy is set
for controlling the technology domain effects. Industry dummy is set for controlling
the industry effect. We control the patent’s first industry.
To minimize the influence of extreme observations, all continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% level in both tails. A full list of the variables and their brief
descriptions are presented in Table 3.
3.3. Model development
In our paper, the dependent variable is a dummy with two categories, so we choose
the logit model, which is seen in Equation (2) to finish our empirical analysis
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 9
(Schmidt & Strauss, 1975). In this model, we set those patents which are held by the
firm as a reference group and the coefficients of patents commercialization (license
or sale) are the comparative results based on this reference group.





1þ exp ðx0bÞ (3)
Selection bias in the treated sample may bring the endogenous problem, to relieve
this problem, we follow the Heckman two-step method (Heckman, 1979). We choose
the government implementing policy for supporting the medium- and long-term sci-
entific and technology-developing national program6 as our instrument variable,
which affects whether the focal patent is the co-patent but does not influence the
commercialization of the focal patent. In this policy, industry, universities, and
research institutions are encouraged, and subsidies are supported for R&D collabor-
ation and co-innovation, which will promote R&D collaboration and the creation of
co-patents. We set this instrument variable (IV) as the dummy variable. This policy
was implemented in 2006. We code this dummy variable 1 if the observation year
was after or included 2006, and otherwise, we code it 0.
4. Results
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used in the
full sample. The correlation coefficients are all below 0.3, indicating that there is no
multicollinearity problem.
Table 5 presents the results of the logit regression models of the full sample to test
Hypotheses 1, which are shown below.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that compared to single-owner patents, co-patents are less
likely to be commercialized on the technology market. In Model 1, the result of the
Table 3. The variables and their brief descriptions.
Variable set Variables Variable definition
Dependent variable Status ¼0 if a patent is held by the firm, ¼1 if a patent is licensed,
¼2 if a patent is sold in the observation year
Independent variable Co-patent ¼1 if the number of applicants is two, otherwise 0
Co-owners’ nature ¼0 if the co-patent is co-owned by companies,
¼1 if the co-patent is co-owned by
a company and a university or a research institution
Co-owners’ country ¼0 if the co-patent is co-owned by a single country,
¼1 if the co-patent is co-owned by multi-countries
High-tech industries ¼1 if the co-patent belongs to high-tech industries, otherwise 0
Control variables Claims Number of claims of the patent at the grant date
Scope Number of technology classes the patent has been classified
PCT ¼1 if the patent is applied through PCT, otherwise 0
Core ¼1 if the patent belongs to the firm’s core tech domain, otherwise 0
Portfolio Number of firm’s valid patents in the observation year
Competition The share of the patents held by the top four
applicants in each patent’s tech class
Year dummy Observation year is controlled
Tech-class dummy Technology classes are controlled
Industry dummy The first industry is controlled
 These variables are used in logarithmic form. For the variables that are measured as numbers, this takes the form
log (variable þ 1).
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probit regression is reported. The instrument variable has a significant and positive
influence on the likelihood of whether a firm will put a patent as a co-patent, which
indicates that we choose a proper instrument variable. Models 2 are the baseline
models in which the control variables and inverse Mills ratio are involved. The coeffi-
cients of control variables are all significant. In Models 3, the independent variable
co-patent and inverse Mills ratio are added. The coefficients on co-patents are signifi-
cantly negative (b ¼ 0.286, p< 0.01). Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Hypotheses 2–4 are developed based on the within-group difference of the treated
groups. Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables
used in the treated group samples. The correlation coefficients are all below 0.6, indi-
cating that there is no multicollinearity problem.
Table 7 presents the results of the logit regression of the treated sample to test
Hypotheses 2–4, which is shown below.













Competition 16.58 11.65 11.60
(0.075) (0.269) (0.269)








Year dummy Yes Yes
Tech-class dummy Yes Yes




Note: Two-tailed; Standard errors in parentheses; Year dummy and technology class dummy were included but are
not shown.VIF was lower than 10; Significance level: p< 0.01.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics (full sample).
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Co-patent 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
2. Scope 0.80 0.20 0.69 1.39 0.02 1.00
3. PCT 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.09 1.00
4. Claims 2.10 0.62 0.69 3.69 0.01 0.07 0.23 1.00
5. Core 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.01 1.00
6. Competition 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.10 1.00
7. Portfolio 2.09 2.99 0.00 9.37 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.22 1.00
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that compared to the co-patents whose co-owners are com-
panies, the co-patents whose co-owners are a company and a university or research
institution are less likely to be commercialized on the technology market. Model 4 is
the baseline model that only includes the control variables. The coefficients of all con-
trol variables are significant. In Model 5, the independent variable of the co-owner’s
nature is added to test Hypotheses 2. The coefficients of the co-owner’s nature are
negative and significant in Model 5 (b ¼ 0.217, p< 0.01). Hypothesis 2
is supported.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that compared to single-country co-owned co-patents, multi-
countries’ co-owned co-patents are less likely to be commercialized on the technology
Table 6. Descriptive statistics (treated sample).
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Co-owner’s nature 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00
2. Co-owner’s country 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.03 1.00
3. High-tech industries 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.06 1.00
4. Scope 0.80 0.19 0.69 1.39 0.06 0.02 0.05 1.00
5. PCT 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.50 0.03 0.04 1.00
6. Claims 2.05 0.60 0.69 3.69 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.10 1.00
7. Core 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 1.00
8. Competition 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.250.06 1.00
9. Portfolio 2.08 3.09 0.00 9.37 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.02 0.030.08 0.21
Table 7. Results of the logit (treated sample).
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Commercialization Commercialization Commercialization Commercialization
Co-owner’s 0.217 0.214 0.311





Scope 0.527 0.528 0.528 0.422
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
PCT 0.438 0.432 0.141 0.156
(0.098) (0.098) (0.117) (0.117)
Claims 0.159 0.166 0.173 0.144
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Core 0.855 0.865 0.859 0.821
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Competition 2.919 2.930 2.923 2.937
(0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106)
Portfolio 0.369 0.368 0.368 0.339
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 9.044 9.027 9.014 8.522
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tech-class dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0875 0.0879 0.0883 0.1076
Chi2 5085.49 5107.00 5127.34 6249.09
N 2,000,884 2,000,884 2,000,884 2,000,884
Note: Two-tailed; Standard errors in parentheses; Year dummy and technology class dummy were included but are
not shown. VIF was lower than 10; Significance level: p< 0.01.
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market. In Model 6, the independent variable of the co-owner’s country is added.
The coefficients of the co-owner’s country are negative and significant in Model 6a
(b ¼ 0.380, p< 0.01). Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that compared to co-patents belonging to non-high-tech
industries, co-patents belonging to high-tech industries are less likely to be commer-
cialization on the technology market. In Model 7, the independent variable of the
high-tech industries is added. The coefficients of the high-tech industries are negative
and significant in Model 7 (b ¼ 2.125, p< 0.01). Hypothesis 4 is supported.
5. Robustness analyses
We conducted robustness tests for our main results using an alternative sample and
alternative model selection. First, we use a nearest-neighbor 1:3 PSM instead of the
previous 1:1 PSM to identify our untreated group sample to keep our sample differ-
ent. Second, we change the previous model to the multinomial logit model (Schmidt
& Strauss, 1975) which is seen in Equation (4). We code our dependent variable as
three categories instead of two alternatives of dummy variables. It is coded as 0 when
a patent is held by the firm in the observation year; it is coded as 1 when a patent is
licensed in the observation year; it is coded as 2 when a patent is sold in the observa-
tion year. If a patent is licensed or sold in the same year, we choose the early date
event as the patent’s condition. Some patents are licensed or sold several times, and
we choose their first licensed or sold event as our observed event. Patents being held
are still chosen as a reference group. The coefficients of the licensed or sold category
are the respectively comparative results based on this reference group. The model is
Table 8. Robustness check results of the mlogit (full sample).
(8a) (8b) (9a) (9b)
Variables License Selling License Selling
Co-patent 0.689 0.153
(0.035) (0.020)
Scope 0.215 0.318 0.227 0.325
(0.083) (0.048) (0.084) (0.048)
PCT 0.668 0.423 0.642 0.430
(0.068) (0.027) (0.068) (0.027)
Claims 0.178 0.124 0.189 0.132
(0.028) (0.017) (0.028) (0.017)
Core 0.637 0.891 0.640 0.892
(0.038) (0.023) (0.038) (0.023)
Competition 11.06 11.75 10.88 11.73
(0.477) (0.330) (0.476) (0.330)
Portfolio 0.953 0.976 0.946 0.976
(0.028) (0.019) (0.028) (0.019)
Constant 130.2 139.6 127.7 139.3
(5.074) (3.483) (5.073) (3.480)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tech_class dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.070 0.070 0.072 0.072
Chi2 14871.81 14871.81 15349.54 15349.54
N 4,865,588 4,865,588 4,865,588 4,865,588
Note: Two-tailed; Standard errors in parentheses; Year dummy and technology class dummy were included but are
not shown. IF was lower than 10; Significance level: p< 0.01.
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shown in Equation (4). These results are shown in Table 8 (full samples) and Table 9
(treated samples), from which we can observe that these results support all our
hypotheses.










where j¼ 1 is the reference group.
6. Conclusion and discussion
Our empirical analysis result supports our hypotheses and answers the previously
noted questions of what is the influence of co-ownership on patents’ commercializa-
tion and which factors of co-patents affect their commercialization. The results show
that co-ownership has a negative impact on patents’ commercialization. In addition, a
company and a university or research institution’s co-owned co-patents are less likely
to be commercialization on the technology market than company and company co-
owned co-patents. Furthermore, multi-countries co-owned co-patents are less likely
to be commercialization on the technology market than single-country co-owned co-
Table 9. Robustness check results of the mlogit (treated sample).
(10a) (10b) (11a) (11b) (12a) (12b) (13a) (13b)
Variables License Selling License Selling License Selling License Selling
Co-owner’s 0.203 0.235 0.199 0.233 0.279 0.332
nature (0.097) (0.055) (0.097) (0.055) (0.097) (0.055)
Co-owner’s 0.554 0.323 0.425 0.124
country (0.164) (0.092) (0.164) (0.093)
High-tech 1.371 2.436
Industries (0.140) (0.111)
Scope 0.382 0.564 0.381 0.565 0.375 0.566 0.314 0.442
(0.164) (0.090) (0.164) (0.090) (0.164) (0.090) (0.164) (0.089)
PCT 1.025 0.634 1.029 0.627 1.460 0.380 1.456 0.399
(0.412) (0.102) (0.412) (0.102) (0.432) (0.125) (0.433) (0.125)
Claims 0.214 0.141 0.218 0.149 0.227 0.156 0.206 0.124
(0.056) (0.031) (0.056) (0.031) (0.056) (0.031) (0.056) (0.032)
Core 0.721 0.924 0.727 0.935 0.717 0.930 0.695 0.887
(0.076) (0.043) (0.076) (0.043) (0.076) (0.043) (0.076) (0.043)
Competition 1.647 3.781 1.633 3.803 1.627 3.794 1.616 3.825
(0.124) (0.143) (0.125) (0.144) (0.125) (0.144) (0.127) (0.146)
Portfolio 0.370 0.378 0.369 0.378 0.368 0.378 0.349 0.346
(0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) 0.375 (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)
Constant 10.03 9.709 10.00 9.695 9.985 9.683 9.625 9.150
(0.231) (0.138) (0.231) (0.139) (0.231) (0.139) (0.234) (0.140)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tech_class dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0858 0.0858 0.0861 0.0861 0.0865 0.0865 0.1050 0.1050
Chi2 5358.80 5358.80 5382.50 5382.50 5403.77 5403.77 6563.18 6563.18
N 2,000,884 2,000,884 2,000,884 2,000,884 2,000,884 2,000,884 2,000,884 2,000,884
Note: Two-tailed; Standard errors in parentheses; Year dummy and technology class dummy were included but are
not shown.VIF was lower than 10; Significance level: p< 0.05, p< 0.01.
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patents. At the same time, co-patents belonging to the high-tech industries are less
likely to be commercialization on the technology market than co-patents belonging to
the non-high-tech industries.
Our study delivers contributions to the extant literature (Lemley & Feldman, 2016;
Love et al., 2018; Motohashi, 2008; Wu et al., 2015). On the one hand, our paper
extends the patents’ commercialization literature by exploring the co-patent’s license
and trade. The licensing and selling of single-owner patents have been studied exten-
sively (Banerjee & Poddar, 2019; Chintagunta et al., 2018; Gambardella et al., 2007;
Jeong et al., 2013; Srivastava & Wang, 2015). However, some special features of co-
patents could make co-patents’ commercialization different from single-owner pat-
ents. These details are less likely to be referred to in the extant literature. Our paper
filling this gap explores this problem. On the other hand, our conclusion firstly indir-
ectly supports the existing literature’ idea that arranging the R&D collaborative fruits
as co-patents is not the best option for companies from the perspective of commer-
cialization (Belderbos et al., 2010; Hagedoorn, 2003). The existing literature illustrates
this point from co-patent’s negative effect on the company’s market value and per-
formance but rarely refer to the patents’ commercialization.
This paper also has important implications for policymakers and practitioners.
Firstly, our conclusion can give inspiration for policymakers. Having a high quality,
co-patents should be encouraged to flow actively for enlarging the public welfare and
increase the economic value of patents. But our result indicated that co-patents can-
not commercialize as well as single-owned patents. Here, we should not ignore the
effect the government policy. Policymakers should implement some policies to pro-
mote the co-patents’ commercialization. For example, the ‘unanimity principle’ of co-
patents’ commercialization can be relieved or deleted in the patent law. Also, some
policies can be made to encourage the co-patents’ flowing, especially for co-patents
belonging to high-tech industries. Secondly, for the practitioners, our paper suggests
that for pursuing the economic value of the R&D collaborative fruits, R&D collabora-
tive intellectual property fruits are not be encouraged to be applied as the co-patents.
Instead, it is encouraged to be applied as the single-owner patent. However, some-
times, it is unavoidable to apply R&D collaborative fruits as a co-patent, in this con-
dition, applying co-patent with a larger patent scope and having Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT.) will facilitate their commercialization to some extent. Furthermore, if
some companies just want to federally apply co-patents for getting the government’s
policy or subsidy supporting and don’t have an interest in the patent’s commercializa-
tion, it is better to choose a university/research institution as the R&D collaborator,
compared to firms.
This study is not without limitations. Firstly, with our present database, it is diffi-
cult to observe and trace the company’s co-owned technology transforms into income
in the internal company. Thus, in this paper, we mainly talk about the co-patents’
commercialization with license and sale in the external technology market. In further
research, we plan to use a questionnaire to explore the co-patents’ internal commer-
cialization. Secondly, as we have mentioned in this paper, the patent laws relevant to
commercialization are different between China, Europe, and the United States. So, it
is necessary to make a comparison on co-patents’ commercialization with the
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situation in the USA, Europe, and China, which can enrich our systematic research
about our topic, the ‘commercialization of co-patents’. However, this comparison
research needs comparable datasets with the same sample framework and the defini-
tions of variables. So, a new dataset and framework are needed to build. We will
make this work in future studies.
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